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Abstract 1 
Making errors represents a stressful event, and the way errors are dealt with are significantly 2 
influenced by individuals’ error orientation. Drawing on the stress literature, scholars have identified 3 
several dimensions underpinning error orientation construct. Nevertheless, empirical studies have 4 
overlooked the construct complexity and do not provide clear theoretical anchors for its 5 
operationalization. This study aims to contribute to the error orientation literature by proposing and 6 
empirically testing a theoretical framework that integrates stress and attitude theories, on a sample of 7 
443 employees. Specifically, we examined the error orientation facets’ relationships with both two 8 
Hofstede’s cultural factors (i.e., power distance and uncertainty avoidance) and work errors (i.e., 9 
slips/lapses and mistakes types). Findings from the test of alternative models and from a structural 10 
equation model showed the uniqueness of each facet, also in relation to additional study variables, 11 
supporting the relevance of adopting this twofold theoretical framework in order to better understand 12 
the nature of each facet. 13 
 14 
Keywords: Error orientation, Power distance culture, Uncertainty avoidance culture, Errors, Hofstede. 15 
 16 
This study was carried out in accordance with the recommendations of the Ethic Committee of the 17 
first author’s Department. All subjects gave written informed consent in accordance with the 18 
Declaration of Helsinki.  19 
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Errors are part of our daily lives. Every individual is occasionally confronted with 1 
oversights, omissions, lapses, wrong actions, misunderstandings, misjudgments or mistakes. 2 
This assumption is also valid in relation to one’s work life. Indeed, “people make mistakes, 3 
machines break. No one is perfect and no organization is likely to achieve this ideal” (LaPorte 4 
& Consolini, 1991, p.19). However, although errors are undesirable performance failures that 5 
may lead to negative consequences –such as frustration and stress, delay in goal attainment, 6 
loss of time and income, or even injuries or accidents– they may also contribute to subsequent 7 
performance (Frese & Keith, 2015). Indeed, they allow for improvements and new insights, 8 
for instance by providing valuable feedback to analyze the situation or by increasing 9 
motivation to change routines, learn something new or develop innovations (Edmondson & 10 
Lei, 2014; van Dyck, Frese, Baer, & Sonnentag, 2005). 11 
Some scholars (Rybowiak, Garst, Frese, & Batinic, 1999), drawing on Lazarus’ 12 
transactional stress theory (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), have conceived errors as stressful 13 
events to cope with. Indeed, the way individuals appraise wrong actions and their willingness 14 
to perceive the potentially positive consequences of errors is influenced by the orientation 15 
towards errors. Individuals with a positive orientation perceive errors as learning 16 
opportunities, appraise them in a favorable light, and tend to constructively cope with them 17 
(Harteis, Bauer, & Gruber, 2008; Rybowiak et al., 1999). They also use the experience of 18 
errors as a motivational basis for engaging in reflective processes with the goal of adopting 19 
effective strategies to be resilient to their negative outcomes, prevent further errors, extract 20 
their informative value and learn for the future (Frese & Keith, 2015; Harteis et al., 2008). 21 
Vice versa, individuals with a negative orientation perceive errors as threats, appraise them 22 
with strain and frustration, and tend to deny or hide them when they occur (Edmondson & 23 
Lei, 2014; Rybowiak et al., 1999; Zhao & Olivera, 2006). Negative attitudes tend to activate a 24 
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deflating cycle that leads to subsequent errors. This may be due, for instance, to negative 1 
emotions (such as anxiety or concern) that distract resources from effective error management 2 
(Brown, Westbroo, & Challagalla, 2005; Hobfoll, 2011). In addition, when individuals 3 
attempt to hide a mistake, for example by denying one’s own responsibility, this might 4 
prevent changes and inhibit learning for future work tasks (Edmondson & Lei, 2014).  5 
Consistent with this framework, Rybowiak and colleagues (1999) conceptualized error 6 
orientation as a construct involving eight facets related to the appraisal and coping processes 7 
to manage stressors. However, after reviewing the literature, it is still not clear how the theory 8 
is specifically reflected to these dimensions. Moreover, empirical studies that adopted this 9 
model have tended to overlook the theoretical framework, merging or selecting some of the 10 
eight dimensions without clearly explaining their assumptions. In light of this, the aim the 11 
present paper is to contribute to the theoretical conceptualization of error orientation by 12 
proposing and empirically testing a twofold frame incorporating stress theory with attitude 13 
theory.  14 
Indeed, scholars have highlighted that attitudes may be depicted not only by their 15 
positive–negative valence, but also by their components (beliefs, emotions and intentions to 16 
behave; Ajzen, 1989; Rosenberg & Hovland, 1960). Thus, error orientation may be further 17 
conceived of as the individual attitude toward errors, expressing a cognitive component (e.g., 18 
believing that mistakes are helpful to improve future decisions, trusting that the earlier an 19 
error is detected the lesser its consequences will be, or thinking that monitoring one’s own 20 
behavior is important to promptly detect possible erroneous actions); an affective component 21 
(e.g., feeling anxious or guilty or careful in the case of making an error); and a behavioral 22 
component (e.g., being willing to recover a wrong action as soon as possible, or trying to 23 
cover it up, or relying on teammates’ help).  24 
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This tripartite view of attitudes (Rosenberg & Hovland, 1960) also assumes that each 1 
component may express different evaluations, either negative or positive. Thus, error 2 
orientation dimensions may describe positive or negative thoughts, positive or negative 3 
emotions, and positive or negative behavioral orientations. This may be the case of employees 4 
who believe that errors will lead to improvements, but at the same time feel anxious or are 5 
willing to cover up their own errors. Taken together, the three components and their valence 6 
may support positive or negative reactions. For instance, by analyzing employees’ attitude 7 
towards change, Piderit (2000) showed that when all components had a positive valence, 8 
change was allowed. Conversely, the non-consistency among component valence could foster 9 
ambivalence toward change, with potentially debilitating effects on responses to change (i.e., 10 
resistance). 11 
In order to better understand the nature of the different error orientation facets, this paper 12 
further aims to analyze whether and how each facet 1) may provide a unique contribution to 13 
containing or enhancing erroneous behavior; and 2) may be shaped by cultural factors. With 14 
respect to our first aim, to the best of our knowledge, although some studies have investigated 15 
the relationship of error orientation with errors (Drach-Zahavy & Pud, 2010; Farnese et al., 16 
2018; Hofmann & Mark, 2006; Mark et al., 2007), none have considered all of the error 17 
orientation dimensions, leaving this important issue unexplored.  18 
As to the second aim, in line with transactional stress theory (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) 19 
and the subsequent assumption that individuals’ orientations toward errors are not generalized 20 
responses (Huish & Poropat, 2008), we will further examine the relationships between error 21 
orientation and cultural factors. Indeed, organizational culture expresses the shared beliefs 22 
and values through which employees make sense of reality and contributes to determine the 23 
way they represent work events, their feelings and their behavioral choices to solve problems. 24 
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Regular audit inspections, an error management approach in training, the analysis of customer 1 
complaints and keeping near-miss records for accountability are examples of organizational 2 
practices that underlie a cultural orientation that conceives errors as a source for learning. At 3 
the same time, the adoption of these practices strengthens employees’ adherence to consistent 4 
norms and values. This study will specifically focus on Hofstede’s (1984, 2001) cultural 5 
dimensions, in line with some scholars’ suggestion that they may be particularly relevant for 6 
dealing with errors in work contexts (Gelfand, Frese, & Salmon, 2011).  7 
Overall, this paper aims to contribute to the conceptualization of individual attitudes 8 
towards errors, providing stronger theoretical roots to the error orientation dimensionality, a 9 
prominent topic in organizational life. This study also aims to provide initial evidence on the 10 
specific relationship that each facet can have with errors (enhancing or hindering the 11 
likelihood of making them) and with cultural factors (namely, when organizational cultures 12 
have a high level of power distance relationships and when they are low tolerant of 13 
uncertainty). 14 
Conceptual framework and hypotheses 15 
Error orientation, a multidimensional construct  16 
Drawing on the transactional stress framework (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), Rybowiak 17 
and colleagues (1999) stated that the way employees interpret and deal with the occurrence of 18 
an error (namely, a stressful event) depends on their error orientation, which is the way they 19 
perceive and appraise an error. Consequently, they proposed a multidimensional construct and 20 
a related scale (the EOQ–Error Orientation Questionnaire), initially including six facets: error 21 
competence, the tendency of developing the knowledge and capability to promptly cope with 22 
errors; learning from errors, the tendency of using errors to plan and improve work processes 23 
to avoid wrong behavior in the future; error risk taking, a state of openness and flexibility 24 
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towards errors; error strain, the general tendency of feeling negative emotions (e.g., fear, 1 
embarrassment, and anger) when errors are evoked; error anticipation, a general awareness 2 
that errors will happen as well as recurrent negative thoughts about them; and covering up 3 
errors, the tendency to deny or hide an error, in order to avoid being blamed. In a later study, 4 
the authors (Rybowiak et al., 1999) added two further dimensions: thinking about errors, the 5 
tendency of being aware of and carefully reflecting on one’s own mistakes; and error 6 
communication, the tendency to openly share information about errors with colleagues. 7 
In order to summarize the empirical literature on error orientation adopting Rybowiak 8 
and colleagues’ model, a qualitative review has been conducted. To find publications for 9 
inclusion, we searched WoS databases using specific keywords linked to the Error Orientation 10 
Questionnaire and to Rybowiak et al.’s (1999) seminal work. We also used a snowball 11 
approach by searching the references of relevant publications to identify further papers. 12 
Inclusion criteria were: a) publications that measured EOQ or some of its scales; b) temporary 13 
lag from 1999 to July 2019; c) selection of empirical papers and dissertations, whereas other 14 
scholarly publications (conference papers, working papers, and practitioner publications) 15 
were removed. The final list included 34 publications and 36 studies (see Table 1).  16 
The review shows that very few studies have included all eight facets, most of them 17 
relying on a few facets or only one. For instance, some authors solely focused on facets 18 
related to the problem/emotion-focused behavioral coping strategies, ignoring appraisal facets 19 
(Fruhen & Keith, 2014; Tjosvold, Yu, & Hui, 2004; van Dyck et al., 2005). Also, risk taking 20 
and error anticipation have been used less frequently than other facets and, when used, the 21 
latter showed low reliability which resulted in its exclusion from further analyzes. When 22 
taking in consideration the structure of the EOQ scale, the literature review also demonstrates 23 
that most studies empirically identified a reduced number of factors, as a result of the 24 
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aggregation of some facets. Particularly, some studies aggregated the facets according to their 1 
positive versus negative attitude toward errors thus defining two broader dimensions (i.e. 2 
error management versus error aversion; van Dyck et al., 2005), or three dimensions by 3 
splitting the negative orientation into its strain and covering up components (Bauer & 4 
Mulder, 2013; Leicher & Mulder, 2016). Moreover, some studies have blurred the model by 5 
merging some facets with other constructs. Overall, the literature seems to suggest a 6 
fragmented view of the error orientation construct, with alternative models not consistent with 7 
Rybowiak et al.’s (1999) and no studies that have explored the factorial structure of the EOQ 8 
scale including all (and only) the error orientation facets. 9 
[INSERT-TABLE-1-ABOUT-HERE] 10 
In the next sections we compare models rooted in different theoretical frameworks. 11 
Specifically, according to the literature review depicted above, and in line with both the stress 12 
(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) and attitude frameworks (Rosenberg & Hovland, 1960), we 13 
hypothesize five alternative models to define the error orientation construct (see Table 2).  14 
Error orientation by adopting the stress framework 15 
Rooted in Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) stress model, we can trace some of Rybowiak 16 
and colleagues’ facets to the appraisal of erroneous actions (i.e., one positive facet, risk and 17 
two negative, anticipation and strain). We can also connect the other facets to the different 18 
coping strategies for dealing with erroneous behaviors: four of them refer to problem-focused 19 
strategies (thinking, communication, competence, and learning) and one expresses an 20 
emotion-focused coping strategy (covering up). Thus, an error orientation model (M1) based 21 
on stress theory as depicted above would be four-faceted, respectively reflecting the positive 22 
and negative appraisal of errors, and the problem- and emotion-focused behavioral strategies.  23 
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On the other hand, some authors (Fruhen & Keith, 2014; Harteis et al., 2008; van Dyck, 1 
2005) considered error strain as a reaction to negative emotions and merged it with covering 2 
up in a general avoidant coping strategy. An alternative model to M1 may then be a four-3 
faceted model (M2) as follow: positive appraisal of errors (risk), negative appraisal of errors 4 
(anticipation), problem-focused coping strategies (thinking, communication, competence, 5 
learning; the so-called “error management approach”) and emotion-focused coping strategies 6 
(strain, covering up; the so-called “error aversion approach’). 7 
Error orientation by adopting the attitude framework 8 
Error orientation can also be described by drawing on attitude theory (Ajzen, 1989; 9 
Rosenberg & Hovland, 1960), specifically considering attitude’s positive and negative 10 
valences. In particular, five error orientation facets capture the positive valence toward errors 11 
(risk, thinking, communication, competence, learning) whereas the other three capture the 12 
negative valence (anticipation, strain, covering up). In line with this, a more parsimonious 13 
model (M3) would propose a dichotomic conceptualization of error orientation, one facet 14 
expressing a positive attitude toward errors and the other a negative one. This model is 15 
consistent with authors that conceive error orientation as bipartite (e.g., Fruhen & Keith, 16 
2014; Tjosvold et al., 2004; van Dyck et al., 2005), although none of them tested it including 17 
all of the eight dimensions. 18 
In addition, drawing on the tripartite attitude model (Rosenberg & Hovland, 1960), error 19 
orientation facets can be also described considering the cognitive, affective and behavioral 20 
components. In particular, three error orientation facets capture the beliefs about errors (risk, 21 
learning, anticipation), one captures the affective component (strain) and the other four 22 
capture the behavioral orientation to cope with errors (thinking, communication, competence, 23 
covering up). Thus, by integrating the positive/negative valence of the attitude with the 24 
RUNNING HEAD: Error orientation at work  
 10 
tripartite model we could suggest a five-facet model (M4) reflecting a positive (risk, learning) 1 
and a negative (anticipation) cognitive component, an affective component (strain), and a 2 
positive (thinking, communication, competence) and negative (covering up) behavioral 3 
component. 4 
Error orientation by adopting both the attitude and stress frameworks 5 
Given the relevance of both stress and attitude theories we may also integrate them and 6 
suggest another model (M5). Specifically, three error orientation facets are related to the 7 
appraisal process: one captures a positive belief about errors (risk taking); one a negative 8 
belief about errors (anticipation); a third one is related to the affective component (strain). 9 
The other five facets are related to the coping process. One expresses a positive cognitive 10 
orientation planning how to deal with errors (learning). Three facets express the problem 11 
focused coping strategies: one related to redefying the problem (thinking); another one related 12 
to seeking for social support (communication); another one to problem solving (competence). 13 
The last facet expresses the emotion focused coping strategies related to denial (covering up). 14 
Individual error orientation and errors 15 
The role that employees’ error orientation plays within many work processes is well 16 
known. Indeed, it has been extensively studied in relation to several personal work-related 17 
variables such as self-esteem, self-efficacy, readiness for change and personal initiative 18 
(Rybowiak et al., 1999). In addition, research has shown error orientation’s relationship with 19 
dispositional variables such as goal orientation (Arenas, Tabernero, & Briones, 2006; Schell 20 
& Conte, 2008), positive motivational state (Amini & Mortazavi, 2012) and work-related 21 
attitudes (Fay & Frese, 2000). Some scholars have also examined error orientation in relation 22 
to performance (e.g., Arenas et al., 2006), reflection at work (Hetzner, Gartmeier, Heid, & 23 
Gruber, 2011) and meta-cognitive processes (Keith & Frese, 2005; König et al., 2007; Steele-24 
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Johnson & Kalinoski, 2014). By applying the individual error orientation at the organizational 1 
level (Putz, Schilling, Kluge, & Stangenberg, 2013; Schell, 2012), others have attested its 2 
relationship with organizational performance indicators, such as economic performance and 3 
firm goal achievement (van Dyck et al., 2005), team innovativeness (Tjosvold & Yu, 2007) 4 
and leadership (Korsten, Stanz, & Blignaut, 2004). 5 
The relationship between error orientation and positive performance seems to be 6 
supported by some empirical evidence. Specifically, employees who have a positive attitude 7 
towards errors also activate learning processes that in turn lead to better performance (Keith 8 
& Frese, 2005; Arenas et al., 2006; Steele-Johnson & Kalinoski, 2014; Dimitrova, van Dyck, 9 
van Hooft, & Groenewegen, 2015). Surprisingly, however, few studies have investigated the 10 
relationship between error orientation and performance failure. Exceptions are Mark and 11 
colleagues’ studies, which found that nurses’ positive orientations toward errors (thinking, 12 
communication and low covering up, aggregated with other variables) predicted lower 13 
medication errors and higher adverse events (Chang & Mark, 2011; Hofmann & Mark, 2006). 14 
Other scholars have shown that problem-focused coping strategies (the so-called error 15 
management approach) decreased healthcare errors (Drach-Zahavy & Pud, 2010; Farnese et 16 
al., 2018). The role of facets expressing a negative orientation have been explored to a lesser 17 
extent. 18 
To further investigate the role of each error orientation facet, the second aim of this paper 19 
is to examine whether and how the different facets are associated with employees’ errors at 20 
work. Specifically, we propose that each dimension may provide a specific contribution in the 21 
attitude–behavior relationship. 22 
With respect to the attitudes’ framework and their basic bidirectional valence (Rosenberg 23 
& Hovland, 1960) and in line with previous findings, we hypothesized that the error 24 
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orientation facets expressing a positive attitude towards errors will be associated with fewer 1 
employee errors. Specifically, employees oriented towards the early detection and careful 2 
analysis of errors (thinking), to their prompt recovery (competence), to openly sharing 3 
information about errors with teammates (communication) and those believing errors may be 4 
a source for improving (learning), will also make less errors. Indeed, when employees 5 
perceive an erroneous situation as a learning opportunity (Dahlin, Chuang, & Roulet, 2018) 6 
and the learning outcome as controllable (Pekrun, Frenzel, Goetz, & Perry, 2007), they will 7 
infuse more effort in their tasks (Dimitrova et al., 2015) and will be more prone to apply 8 
proactive strategies, such as seeking for constructive feedback (Winters & Latham, 1996). 9 
This in turn will lead to a better understanding of work processes and more knowledge about 10 
how to successfully perform their job (Stern, Katz-Navon, & Naveh, 2008). In general, in line 11 
with stress theories, we assume that positively oriented employees will perceive errors as less 12 
threatening events, thus inducing a lower resource loss (Hobfoll, 2011), and will adopt 13 
problem-focused coping strategies, being more effective in managing stress (Brown et al., 14 
2005; King & Beher, 2017). In addition, by taking an agentic perspective (Bandura, 2018), we 15 
can further suppose that these orientations support individual’s forethought capability, 16 
motivating employees to create action plans, regulate their behavior to achieve the expected 17 
standards, and enhance their self-reflectiveness (Chang & Mark, 2011; Drach-Zahavy & Pud, 18 
2010; Farnese et al., 2018; Hofmann & Mark, 2006). 19 
An exception among the positive facets may be risk taking. Indeed, employees high in 20 
risk-taking assume that some errors are inevitable to achieve work results or even that it is 21 
better to make mistakes than not accomplish anything (Rybowiak et al., 1999). Their low 22 
alertness for possible error occurrence could decrease monitoring behaviors, thus enhancing 23 
the frequency of errors (Horvath & Zuckerman, 1993). In summary, we hypothesize a 24 
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significant and negative relationship between thinking, communication, competence, and 1 
learning facets and errors, as well as a positive risk–errors relationship. 2 
On the other hand, following Rybowiak and colleagues (1999) we can suppose that the 3 
error orientation facets expressing negative believes (anticipation), affects (strain) and 4 
intentions to behave (covering up) will be positively associated with a higher frequency of 5 
employee errors. Specifically, employees who think that the likelihood of erring in 6 
performing their task is high (anticipation), who feel negative emotions if errors occur 7 
(strain), and who aim to hide their erroneous actions (covering up), will also more likely 8 
make more errors. Indeed, emotion-focused coping strategies, aimed to modulate unpleasant 9 
affect engendered by an error experience, tend to reduce one’s responsibility and proactivity 10 
in reparative actions and will lead to resignation. Thus, employees will hide the erroneous 11 
action and avoid reporting the error (covering up), thereby increasing the likelihood of 12 
persisting in making errors (Webb et al., 2012). Further, drawing on the emotion-regulation 13 
literature (Webb, Miles & Sheeran, 2012), we can propose that the tendency to prevent the 14 
occurrence of an unpleasant event (anticipation) or to feel negative emotions evoked by errors 15 
(strain), are appraisal processes that will interfere with cognitive processes and distract 16 
resources away from tasks and when handling errors (Hobfoll, 2011), subsequently enhancing 17 
their frequency. Conversely, it is also plausible that individuals who anticipate possible errors 18 
and are stressed by committing errors, will make less errors because it makes them more 19 
aware and cautious (Brown et al., 2005; Fogarty, 2005; King & Beeher, 2017; Zhao & 20 
Olivera, 2006). 21 
We further hypothesize that the strength of the attitude–behavior relationship may be 22 
different for different facets. Specifically, following the tripartite attitude conceptualization 23 
(Ajzen, 1989), we propose that cognitive (risk, learning, anticipation) and affective (strain) 24 
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attitudes toward errors will have a looser association with employees’ errors, in comparison to 1 
behavioral intentions (thinking, communication, competence, covering up). 2 
 3 
The role of Hofstede’s cultural factors  4 
Literature on error orientation assumes it is a personal attitude that may be shaped by 5 
specific contextual variables, affecting the individuals’ appraisal of the straining event and 6 
their consequent reactions (Huish & Poropat, 2008; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Zotzmann, 7 
van der Linden, & Wyrwa, 2019). Indeed, cultural background permeates organizational life 8 
by defining the set of shared assumptions and beliefs. These, in turn, provide meaning and 9 
models for employees’ work attitudes, perceptions and behaviors, including the way they 10 
cope with errors. For instance, Hofstede (1990; 2011) defines cultures as collective 11 
phenomena that distinguish the members of one group from others. At the organizational 12 
level, they are embedded in visible and conscious practices, namely the employees’ shared 13 
perception of how activities and social interactions unfold in their organization (Hofstede, 14 
2011; Taras, Kirkman, & Steel, 2010).  15 
Rybowiak and colleagues (1999) have suggested that Hofstede’s (1984) cultural factors 16 
could influence the way employees deal with errors and learn from them. As well, Gelfand 17 
and colleagues (2011) suggested that some cultural variables (e.g., uncertainty avoidance and 18 
power distance, among others) might affect employees’ attitudes and beliefs about errors, and 19 
thereby contribute to the occurrence of errors.  20 
Consequently, the third aim of this study is to further examine the error orientation 21 
conceptualization by testing the relationships among its dimensions and cultural factors. We 22 
specifically focused on the role played by two prominent cultural factors proposed by 23 
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Hofstede (1984, 2001) –power distance and uncertainty avoidance– which the literature has 1 
highlighted as particularly relevant with respect to errors (Gelfand et al., 2001).  2 
Power distance refers to the extent to which people expect and accept an unequal 3 
distribution of power between levels in the social system (Hofstede, 1984). Organizations 4 
with high power distance tend to rely on hierarchically stratified structures, more centralized 5 
decisions and autocratic leadership (Hofstede, 2001). This type of work environment often 6 
results in a reduction of the lines of communication between operational personnel and 7 
management and affects decision-making processes (e.g., managers do not seek to ensure 8 
employees’ participation, disagreement cannot be expressed) (Bialas, 2009; Hofstede, 1984; 9 
Liu, Yang, & Nauta, 2013).  10 
To test the error orientation multidimensional model, we will analyze whether the 11 
different error orientation facets have specific relationships with cultures supporting power 12 
distance. We hypothesize that the communication regarding threatening topics, such as the 13 
occurrence of an erroneous action, will be more problematic when these cultures are strong. 14 
For instance, employees may feel they receive little to no support when an error happens 15 
(Cole, Carter, & Zhang, 2013) and be reluctant to report errors (Shimizu & Hitt, 2011). Thus, 16 
we propose employees will shun away from communicating with others and evade asking for 17 
support in the case of errors (that is, a significant and negative power distance–18 
communication relationship). 19 
Further, when working in cultural contexts with high levels of power distance, employees 20 
tend to avoid seeking feedback about their performance related to errors (König et al., 2007) 21 
and to turn a blind eye on their colleagues’ or own errors (Zotzmann et al., 2019). They do not 22 
engage in extra-role behaviors (such as discussion of faulty work procedures or other 23 
interpersonally threatening situations) nor they question their leaders’ behaviors and decisions 24 
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(Helmreich, Wihelm, Klinect, & Merritt, 2001; Liu et al., 2013). Thus, we suggest that 1 
employees will tend to deny their own responsibility for wrong actions and are more likely to 2 
cover them up (that is, a significant and positive power distance–covering up relationship). 3 
In high power-distance organizational cultures, employees also share the belief that errors 4 
can be threatening events (e.g., expecting that, when an error occurs, they could be punished 5 
for their flaws or losing face or even their jobs), therefore being highly aware of their possible 6 
occurrence and feeling feared or shamed when an error happens. Thus, we hypothesize that in 7 
these contexts, employees will demonstrate a higher general negative attitude towards errors 8 
(that is, a significant and positive power distance–anticipation relationship) and stronger 9 
negative emotions related to error occurrence (that is, a significant and positive power 10 
distance–strain relationship). 11 
Overall, an erroneous event enhances employees’ strain and their tendency to counteract 12 
the erroneous action by denying, hiding or underestimating personal responsibility for its 13 
occurrence (König et al., 2007). This, in turn, exerts detrimental implications on 14 
communicative and decisional processes (Hofstede, 1984) and activates a “vicious cycle” that 15 
leads to persisting in errors and hindering learning from them (Catino, 2008; Edmondson & 16 
Lei, 2014). Thus, we further hypothesized that high power-distance cultures shape employees’ 17 
negative attitudes toward errors, paving the way to more frequent work errors (that is, error 18 
orientations will mediate the power distance–errors relationship).  19 
Uncertainty avoidance defines the way the members of an organization feel when in 20 
unknown or ambiguous situations (Hofstede, 1984). Employees working in cultures with high 21 
levels of uncertainty-avoidance are guided by the desire for predictability and structure in 22 
their work and relationships (Hofstede, 2001). They are also more risk aversive in their 23 
decision-making (Ladbury & Hinsz, 2009) and attempt to minimize the anxiety of the 24 
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unknown by establishing well-defined policies, formal rules and laws to impose certainty to 1 
various domains of life (Gelfand et al., 2011). This leads to increased control by closely 2 
monitoring the environment, placing emphasis on error awareness and prevention, adhering to 3 
well-structured routines and standard operating procedures (Mohamed, Ali, & Tam, 2009).  4 
Overall, the literature suggests that high levels of uncertainty avoidance may imply a loss 5 
of flexibility that might reduce the resilience of the system when something unexpected 6 
happens (Gelfand et al., 2011). Thus, the occurrence of an error –which by definition is an 7 
unexpected outcome due to an alteration of planned procedure or usual routine– might 8 
represent a serious stressor in these cultural contexts. We hypothesize that employees, when 9 
working in strongly uncertainty-avoidant cultures, will be oriented towards low risk taking 10 
(that is, a significant and negative uncertainty avoidance–risk relationship) and may feel 11 
highly strained when an error occurs (that is, a significant and positive uncertainty avoidance–12 
strain relationship).  13 
On the other hand, cultures high in uncertainty avoidance might support positive coping 14 
strategies aimed at the early detection of errors, effectively recovering and learning from 15 
them. Specifically, we hypothesized that employees tend to preserve clear and effective 16 
operative standards to monitor their work performance for error refrain, and to quickly detect 17 
them once they occur (that is, a significant and positive uncertainty avoidance–thinking 18 
relationship). In these cultures, employees also feel free to communicate with colleagues to 19 
solve negative consequences (Baker & Carson, 2011), being more oriented towards asking for 20 
help (that is, a significant and positive uncertainty avoidance–communication relationship). 21 
They will be also more committed to quickly managing errors to avoid worse consequences 22 
(that is, a significant and positive uncertainty avoidance–competence relationship). Further, 23 
while in these cultures employees adhere to established norms, rules, procedures and routines, 24 
RUNNING HEAD: Error orientation at work  
 18 
they also flexibly adapt or change them to acquire a safer position in the future. Thus, we 1 
propose that they are likely to believe errors may have an informative value to avoid future 2 
errors (that is, a significant and positive uncertainty avoidance–learning relationship).  3 
Overall, we hypothesize that uncertainty avoidant cultures, shaping employees’ positive 4 
attitudes toward errors, are associated with lower levels of work errors (that is, error 5 
orientations will mediate the uncertainty avoidance–errors relationship). 6 




Participants and procedures 11 
Participants included 443 Italian employees. Their mean age was 44.25 years (SD= 12 
11.58), and 43.6% were males. About 50.3% of the sample had a high school degree, while 13 
35.5% had a university degree or more (9.5%). They worked for their current organization for 14 
an average of 15.27 years (SD= 11.41) and had a mean job tenure of 19.70 years (SD= 11.45). 15 
With regard to their job position, 11.5% were managers; 27.9% white-collar workers; 27.3% 16 
specialized technicians; and 32.3% blue-collar workers. 17 
Data were collected by students as part of their bachelor’s thesis, using a convenience 18 
sampling procedure. To ensure variability, each student approached between 10 and 30 19 
employees, which resulted in a sample drawn from very heterogeneous sectors, type and size 20 
(Table 3). Participants voluntarily participated in the study and did not receive any kind of 21 
reward, financial or otherwise. Each participant received the questionnaire in a blank 22 
envelope and a presentation letter, which contained a brief description of the research, its 23 
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main objectives, and a guarantee for the confidentiality of their responses. The ethic 1 




Error orientation was measured by the 37-item Error Orientation Questionnaire (EOQ) 6 
by Rybowiak and colleagues (1999). The EOQ measures the following eight facets: error risk 7 
taking (4 items); thinking about errors (5 items); error communication (4 items); error 8 
competence (4 items); learning from errors (4 items); error anticipation (5 items); error 9 
strain (5 items); and covering up errors (6 items). Items are listed in Table 6. Each item asked 10 
to what extent it applied to them, on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1= not at all to 5= 11 
totally. Items were translated in Italian using the back-translation method. Specifically, in a 12 
first step two of the authors independently translated the items. Next, authors discussed the 13 
individual solutions. Since no relevant problem emerged, they agreed on the most appropriate 14 
version and the final wording. Because the measurement model (CFA) of this scale is one of 15 
the research questions that includes also testing alternative models, it is reported in the result 16 
section. 17 
Power distance and uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede, 1981) were assessed adopting the 18 
scale developed by Dorfman and Howell (1988). In particular, rather than asking how the 19 
culture should be (values), following Hofstede’s suggestions for tapping organizational 20 
cultures, we asked how they actually perceive their organizational culture in practice. Power 21 
distance was measured by a 5-item scale assessing the extent to which the members of an 22 
organization accept a vertical distribution of power (e.g., “Managers make most decisions 23 
without consulting subordinates”). Similarly, uncertainty avoidance was assessed by a 5-item 24 
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scale which describes the degree the organization has structured, well-defined and formalized 1 
procedures and routines aimed to ensuring the predictability and stability of the work 2 
experience (e.g., “We have job requirements and instructions spelled out in detail, so that 3 
employees always know what they are expected to do”). Responses were given on a 5-point 4 
Likert scale ranging from 1= not at all true to 5= completely true. Preliminary CFA supported 5 
the dimensionality of the scale (χ2(33)= 113.66, p< .01; CFI= .95; RMSEA= .074 (CI = .059–6 
.089), p<. 01; SRMR= .052). Loadings ranged from .49 to .85 and the two dimensions correlated 7 
with each other (i.e., .15). 8 
Work errors were assessed using a scale generated ad hoc for this study to detect 9 
employees’ perceptions about the occurrence of some typical errors performed within daily 10 
work activities. The scale was designed by using both top-down and bottom-up approaches. 11 
Specifically, we drew on Reason’s (1990) error classical taxonomy, which distinguishes 12 
between wrong actions due to the incorrect execution of a correct action sequence (i.e., slips, 13 
operative errors; and lapses, omission errors) and wrong actions due to the correct execution 14 
of an incorrect rule or procedure (i.e., mistakes, interpretation errors that result from 15 
incomplete or outdated knowledge, or using incorrect information regarding which 16 
procedures apply). We operationalized this conceptualization by using 15 in-depth interviews 17 
conducted with employees from different sectors, through the critical interview method 18 
(Flanagan, 1954). Based on both the interviews and Reason’s categorization, a list of 15 items 19 
was produced. Afterwards, one of the authors and an external expert independently assigned 20 
items to related dimensions and compared their rate of agreement, reducing the list to 7 items 21 
through semantic evaluation. The final list included items related to Reason’s (1990) basic two 22 
dimensions: slips/lapses; and mistakes due to knowledge or rule-based errors. Items are listed 23 
in Table 4. Participants were asked to indicate, according to their own individual perceptions, 24 
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the frequency they made the listed errors (“During daily work activities, how often do the 1 
following happen to you?”) rating items on a Likert scale ranging from 1= never or almost 2 
never to 5= always or almost always. Preliminary CFA conducted by using a cross validation 3 
approach supported the dimensionality of the scale. In particular, we randomly split the sample 4 
in two halves and conducted the CFA on the two samples independently. Results showed the 5 
adequacy of the two-factor model (Sample 1: χ2(12)= 20.84, p<.01; CFI= .98; RMSEA= .058 6 
(CI = .000–.099), p=.33; SRMR= .031; Sample 2: χ2(12)= 21.66, p<.01; CFI= .98; RMSEA= 7 
.059 (CI = .011–.098), p=.31; SRMR= .030), also when compared with an alternative one-8 
factor model (Total sample two-factor model: χ2(12)= 33.25, p<.01; CFI= .98; RMSEA= .063 9 
(CI = .038–.089), p=.18; SRMR= .025; Total sample one-factor model: χ2(13)= 51.06, p<.01; 10 
CFI= .93; RMSEA= .113 (CI = .081–.146), p<.01; SRMR= .045). Loadings from the CFA on 11 
the total sample ranged from .56 to .76 and the two dimensions correlated with each other .76.  12 
Descriptive statistics and internal consistency for all the scales are reported in Table 7. 13 
Data analysis  14 
In order to examine the dimensionality of the error orientation questionnaire, we tested 15 
and compared the hypothesized models using a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) approach. 16 
Akaike Information Criteria (AIC), Bayesian information criterion (BIC) and the log-17 
likelihood function were used to compare the alternative factorial models. In addition, Chi 18 
square, Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 19 
and Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) were also considered to examine the 20 
fit of each model. These fit indices were evaluated considering the following cutoff criteria: 21 
CFI 0.90 or greater (Hu & Bentler, 1999); RMSEA up to 0.06 and a stringent upper limit of 22 
.07 (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Steiger, 2007); SRMR up to 0.08 (Hu & Bentler, 1999) as indicating 23 
a good fit. Internal consistency of the scales was examined considering both Cronbach’s alpha 24 
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and the factor score determinacy coefficients. Discriminant validity was then examined by 1 
testing a full structural equation model (SEM) considering both power distance and 2 
uncertainty avoidance as independent variables of the error orientation dimensions, and 3 
slips/lapses and mistakes as the dependent variables. Preliminary to the examination of the 4 
hypothesized structural model (Figure 1), we tested the adequacy of the measurement model 5 
(Bollen, 1989), followed by a comparison with an alternative one-factor model. This allowed 6 
a check of the common method bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2012). In 7 
addition, when testing the SEM, we defined a common latent variable to take into account the 8 
fact that all items were measured using only one source of information. Finally, we tested the 9 
indirect effects of cultural factors on errors through error orientation by using the indirect 10 
effect test implemented in Mplus. For each of the effects, the bootstrapped confidence 11 
intervals were computed. 12 
Results 13 
Dimensionality of the Error Orientation  14 
As shown in Table 5, the model supporting the eight-facet conceptualization by Rybowiak 15 
and colleagues (M5), showed the best fit to the data. An inspection of the modification 16 
indices revealed that one source of misfit was due to three significant error covariances 17 
(STR5 with STR2, CPT1 with CPT3, and TNK5 with TNK6). Hence, we allowed correlating 18 
the residuals of the three pairs of items, since they refer to specific content (respectively, 19 
items STR5 and STR2 refer to being worried and afraid of doing something wrong; items 20 
CPT1 and CPT3 refer to feeling competent to correct a mistake; and items TNK5 and TNK6 21 
refer to thinking thoroughly about an error that occurred). The fit indices of the revised 22 
model were good with the exception of the CFI that was lower than .90 (χ2 = 1418, df= 598, 23 
p< .001; CFI= .86; RMSEA= .055 (CI= .052–.059), p< .05; SRMR= .066). Results showed 24 
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that all of the loadings were significant and higher than .30 with the exception of one item of 1 
error anticipation (ANT5) that showed a loading of .25 (Table 6).  2 
As shown in Table 7, most of the error orientation dimensions correlated with each other. 3 
Specifically, positive dimensions were positively related (risk, thinking, communication, 4 
competence, learning) and the negative ones as well (anticipation, strain, covering up), thus 5 
confirming a common underlying valence, in line with the dichotomic model of attitudes. 6 
However, results showed an unexpected pattern of correlations between negative and positive 7 
dimensions, because only covering up negatively correlated with all of the positive error 8 
orientation facets. This negative relationship did not emerge among the other dimensions: 9 
anticipation, although expressing a negative attitude toward errors, correlated positively with 10 
all of the positive error orientation facets; and strain correlated negatively with competence, 11 
but had no significant relationship (risk-taking, communication and learning) or even a 12 
positive relationship (thinking) with the positive EOQ dimensions. Thus, the two negative 13 
cognitive (anticipation) and emotional (strain) attitudes, although positively related to the 14 
negative behavioral intentions toward errors (covering up), also showed a positive association 15 
with positive attitudes. 16 
Finally, Cronbach’s alpha analysis supported good internal consistency for all facets, 17 




Discriminant validity  22 
The measurement model resulted in a good fit: χ2(1307)= 2,529.7, p< .01; CFI= .87; 23 
RMSEA= .046 (90% C.I.= .043−.048), p= 1.00; SRMR = .058, whereas results of the one-24 
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factor model showed a poor fit to the data: χ2(1373)= 7,122.2, p< .001, CFI= .37, RMSEA= .097 1 
(90% C.I.= .095−.099), p= .001; SRMR= .125. This suggests the absence of common method 2 
bias, supported also by the significant chi-square difference test between the two models (p< 3 
.001). However, in order to take into account the possible common method bias, the model 4 
was estimated by including the common latent factor. The model fits the data well with the 5 
exception of the CFI that was lower than .90 (χ2(1323)= 2571.291; p< .001; CFI= .86; RMSEA= 6 
.046 (CI= .043–.049), p= .99; SRMR= .062). Results of this model (Figure 2) showed that 7 
power distance, as hypothesized, was significantly related to the negative facets of error 8 
orientation. Specifically, the more the organizational culture lacked participation and had an 9 
unequal distribution of power, the more employees felt strained when they made errors 10 
(strain: .24, p< .001), and tended to hide or deny them (covering up: .21, p< .001). They also 11 
tended to not communicate with teammates about errors nor seek help and support from them 12 
(communication: -.27, < .001). The model also showed the hypothesized relationships 13 
between uncertainty-avoidant cultures and EOQ facets. Indeed, the more employees valued 14 
their organizational culture oriented towards enhancing predictability and reducing ambiguity, 15 
the more employees carefully analyzed mistakes that occurred (thinking: .37, p< .001), 16 
promptly corrected them (competence: .33, p< .001), told others about them and relied on 17 
colleagues for help (communication: .27, p< .001) and used negative feedback to improve in 18 
the future (learning: .18, p< .001). They also felt more strained when an error occurred 19 
(strain: .10, p< .05). Risk-taking resulted unrelated (.08, p= .278). 20 
Furthermore, results showed that two positive dimensions, competence and 21 
communications, were related to error reduction (specifically, competence–mistakes: -.26; 22 
p<.001; competence–slips/lapses: -.76; p<.001; communication –mistakes: -.16; p<.05). 23 
Conversely, the positive risk-taking dimension was positively related to errors (risk–24 
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slips/lapses: .27; p<.001). Anyhow the positive thinking–slips/lapses relationship should not 1 
be interpreted; indeed, given the nonsignificant correlation between these two variables and 2 
the high correlation of thinking with the other EOQ facets, it is possible that the significant 3 
beta coefficient is a statistical artefact of the regression. Conversely, the two anticipation and 4 
covering up negative dimensions were positively related to errors (anticipation–mistakes: .39; 5 
p<.001; covering up–slips/lapses: .19; p<.001), whereas strain was not. The model also 6 
showed that power distance was directly associated with both slips and mistakes 7 
(respectively, .22 p<.000, and .14 p<.05). Results of the indirect effects showed that power 8 
distance is associated with slips through covering (ß= 0.038, p<.05) and uncertainty 9 
avoidance is associated with both slips and mistakes through competence (respectively, ß= -10 
.25 p<.01; ß= -.086 p<.01). Overall, the model explained 37% of the variance of slips and 11 




This paper aimed to contribute to the error orientation conceptualization by providing 16 
theoretical anchors to its multidimensionality. The test of alternative models showed that the 17 
model incorporating the stress theory with the attitude theory had a better fit than the more 18 
parsimonious ones. This model overcomes the positive-negative dichotomy often adopted by 19 
scholars, supporting the complex eight-facet error orientation proposed by Rybowiak and 20 
colleagues (1999). Specifically, results from the measurement model showed that all eight 21 
dimensions contributed to the construct definition, the weaker ones included. Indeed, the 22 
error competence dimension proved to have adequate internal reliability, similar to that of the 23 
Dutch version by Rybowiak and colleagues, but in contrast to the lower reliability found in 24 
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their English version (Rybowiak et al., 1999) and in other studies (Schell & Conte, 2008). 1 
Also error anticipation, a dimension seldom used in the literature or deleted because of poor 2 
reliability, demonstrated sufficient psychometric properties in the present study. 3 
This finding is also supported by correlations among error orientation dimensions, that 4 
showed some unexpected patterns, suggesting that merging all of the negative dimensions in a 5 
single approach would lose informative value. Indeed, the anticipation and strain from error 6 
appraisal dimensions, although expressing negative attitudes toward errors, were not related 7 
to the positive error orientation facets. This is in line with some empirical evidence suggesting 8 
that strain and covering up could tap separate processes that do not conceptually coincide 9 
neither lead to the same outcomes (see van Dyck et al., 2005). We propose that strain could 10 
have a nonlinear relationship with the positive facets, since this emotional dimension, 11 
although eliciting negative feelings, may contribute not only to emotion-focused strategies, 12 
but also to problem-focused strategies. Future research should verify a possible interactive 13 
contribution of strain to the adoption of different coping strategies, or explore boundary 14 
conditions that turn strain toward problem-focused rather than emotion-focused coping 15 
strategies. For instance, the psychological safety climate among teammates could moderate 16 
the strain–learning relationship (Edmondson & Lei, 2014). 17 
Overall, the model based on the twofold frame is consistent with the stress theory, 18 
acknowledging the specificity of the appraisal and coping processes. It is also in line with the 19 
tripartite view of attitudes, which holds that the cognitive, affective and behavioral 20 
orientations represent conceptually distinct components that, although related to the same 21 
underlying attitude, express different categories of psychological significance and are not 22 
completely redundant (Ajzen, 1989). 23 
The present results also allow a better understanding of the role of error orientation facets 24 
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in relation to possible cultural factors and error outcomes. In general, they provide some initial 1 
evidence consistent with the well-established relationship between positive coping orientations 2 
towards errors (communication, competence) and error reduction. Conversely, employees who 3 
tend to positively appraise errors, assuming that making errors is an inevitable risk to achieve 4 
work results, showed a positive relationship with errors. This facet expresses openness and 5 
flexibility towards errors and may imply an underestimation of danger from wrong actions and 6 
lower monitoring of one’s own behaviors, thus paving the way to errors (Horvath & Zuckerman, 7 
1993). 8 
These results further add to the literature providing empirical support to the overlooked 9 
negative orientation–errors relationship. Specifically, employees who tend to adopt a negative 10 
appraisal about errors by expressing pessimistic expectations (anticipation) and those who tend 11 
to adopt covering up emotion-focused strategies and fear being blamed when committing an 12 
error (covering up), make more errors.  13 
It is worth noting that, although all of these relationships are consistent with our hypotheses, 14 
some relationships were not significant. Indeed, cognitive and emotional facets were not related 15 
to errors. This seems to be in line with the attitude conceptualization by Ajzen (1989), 16 
according to which the behavior component of attitudes is directly related to actual responses 17 
(namely, error reduction/increase), whereas cognitive and affective attitudes may be considered 18 
distal antecedents. Future longitudinal studies should test a model based on the causal-chain 19 
perspective suggested by Ajzen (1989), verifying whether beliefs and affect lead to the intention 20 
to behave which, in turn, determine actual behavior (i.e. errors).  21 
The need for a complex conceptualization of error orientation is further supported by 22 
findings related to the relationship of its facets with Hofstede’s cultural factors. Consistent with 23 
our hypotheses, employees working in high uncertainty-avoidance cultures were more oriented 24 
RUNNING HEAD: Error orientation at work  
 28 
to cope with errors. Thus, the desire for predictability typical of these cultural models enhances 1 
employees’ tendency to adopt problem-focused strategies in order to avoid larger negative 2 
consequences and their repetition in the long run (secondary prevention), although enacting 3 
employees’ negative affect (strain) toward undesirable events. This result also adds to the 4 
uncertainty avoidance literature, supporting conceptualizations of this cultural feature regarding 5 
its possible adaptive function, rather than being strictly oriented to predictability (Baker & 6 
Carson, 2011; Schneider & De Meyer, 1991). The hypothesized uncertainty avoidance–risk 7 
negative relationship was not supported. 8 
Similarly, power distance cultures were significantly and positively related to employees’ 9 
negative attitudes toward errors. This means that employees holding a perception of 10 
imbalanced power relationships among teammates are more likely to experience a negative 11 
emotional appraisal, feel shamed or worried about being blamed (error strain) and tend to deny 12 
or hide their responsibility for errors (covering up). They also tend to avoid communicating 13 
about their own errors and refraining from asking teammates for help (Gelfand et al., 2011; Liu 14 
et al., 2013). The hypothesized power distance–anticipation positive relationship was not 15 
supported. Results also showed a direct relationship between power distance and errors. 16 
The model, on the whole, partially supported the hypothesized relationships between 17 
cultural factors and error orientation. Indeed, most dimensions were related to the two cultural 18 
factors, except uncertainty avoidance–risk and power distance–anticipation relationships. 19 
Some scholars asserted that error orientation is a malleable personal construct that can be 20 
shaped by social contexts (Gelfand et al., 2011; Huish & Poropat, 2008). Findings of our study 21 
highlight that coping dimensions seem to be influenced by cultural context, whereas appraisal 22 
dimensions are not. We may suppose that the risk and anticipation non-significant 23 
relationships could be due to their general focus (respectively, believing that it is better to err 24 
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rather do nothing, and expecting that something will go wrong when working) rather than a 1 
focus on a specific work-error experience. In other words, results suggest that organizational 2 
culture do not influence the generalized orientations through which individuals interpret and 3 
evaluate how threatful errors may be, whereas it seems to change individual level of error 4 
orientations when they are related to coping intentions. Nonetheless, future studies are needed 5 
to provide stronger empirical support for these preliminary findings, for instance through a 6 
multilevel or longitudinal design, that would allow to test causality relationships.  7 
Overall, the composite patterns of relationships between the two cultural factors and the 8 
error orientation dimensions underline the usefulness of considering a multidimensional 9 
structure for this construct and suggest that merging EOQ’s different facets in an overall 10 
positive/negative dimension could be misleading, above all when analyzing their relationship 11 
with other variables.  12 
Finally, the model tested a mediating effect of cultural factors on errors through error 13 
orientation, showing a total indirect effect for both uncertainty avoidance and power distance. 14 
Thus, cultural norms, practices and shared believes about errors are variously related to 15 
different attitudes toward errors, that in turn relate to erroneous behaviors. Future research 16 
should explore whether these different relationships could outline specific patterns that, from 17 
cultural factors, contribute to enhance/reduce the probability that employees make errors at 18 
work, by shaping their error orientation. For instance, following Ajzen and Fishbein’s (1980) 19 
theory of reasoned action, we could propose that individual attitudes toward errors represent 20 
the underlying motivation to perform an action, and that social norms (i.e., believes and 21 
perceptions shared in relevant groups, such as organizational or professional contexts) also 22 
contribute to how employees will actually engage in a behavior, both directly exerting a 23 
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pressure to correctly/erroneously behave, and indirectly affecting it through their behavioral 1 
intention attitude. 2 
This study also makes a cross-cultural contribution to the EOQ’s validation given that, as 3 
far as we know, it is the first study conducted in a Latin European country. Indeed, the 4 
national culture in our study differs from the Germanic or Anglo countries where most studies 5 
on errors have been conducted, being Italy a country where a blame-guilt culture is widespread, 6 
power distance with authorities are stronger, leadership style is less participative and tolerance 7 
for ambiguity and uncertainty is lower (Catino, 2008; House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & 8 
Gupta, 2004; Lorenzoni & Lewis, 2004). In this way, we embraced Hofstede’s (1984) suggestion 9 
to enhance cross-cultural research on his dimensions. Anyhow we focused on one single culture, 10 
thus further studies considering additional countries (Zotzmann et al., 2019) or specific 11 
organizational or professional cultures are needed to check whether errors could be conceived of 12 
as more troublesome than in other cultural contexts.  13 
Practical implications 14 
As errors represent an unavoidable part of an individual’s work experience, their role in 15 
fostering organizational learning is widely recognized (Frese & Keith, 2015; Edmondson & Lei, 16 
2014). Results of this study highlight the importance of cultural factors in shaping employees’ 17 
attitude toward errors, affecting their awareness and the propensity to learn from them or not. 18 
From a practical point of view, this suggests that management should encourage a low power 19 
distance culture, where mistakes are not blamed or penalized, while also encouraging 20 
employees’ awareness about feedback (even when negative) regarding their work or promoting 21 
communication about mistakes (König et al., 2007), also exerting a modelling role on how to 22 
deal with errors (Farnese et al., 2018). As well, a cultural context oriented to minimize the 23 
anxiety of ambiguous situations does not seem to lead to a loss of flexibility when an 24 
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unexpected event happens, rather it seems to enhance the resilience of the system by 1 
activating effective coping strategies (Baker & Carson., 2001). Thus, a work environment 2 
designed to establish well-defined policies and formal rules could help not only in preventing 3 
errors, but also in reducing their negative consequences after a wrong action and in increasing 4 
the likelihood of learning from them, making the organization able to adopt a twofold error 5 
handling approach (Frese & Keith, 2015; Catino, 2008). 6 
The present findings may also be of relevant use in training projects (Amini & Mortazavi, 7 
2012; Frese & Keith, 2015; Keith & Frese, 2005). Raising awareness about preferred personal 8 
attitudes, and recognizing their advantages and disadvantages, may help instructors develop 9 
interventions that enable trainees to gain confidence in their error-coping competence and to 10 
perform more effectively, thereby benefiting both the individual and the organization. 11 
Limitations and directions for future research 12 
Some limitations of the present study need to be addressed. Firstly, the data were 13 
obtained through a self-report questionnaire, raising concerns regarding the eventual common 14 
method variance issues. Although the hypotheses were tested while controlling for the 15 
common latent factor, the findings of this study must be interpreted cautiously given the 16 
limitations of the self-report nature of our data, due for instance to the risk of underestimation 17 
of self-assessed work errors or to an overestimation of own error competence or learning 18 
capability. Further, the cross-sectional study design precludes the ability to make statements 19 
of cause and effect, thus additional research would benefit from longitudinal designs to test 20 
the process we hypothesized or alternative ones. For instance, we assumed that individual 21 
error orientation leads employees to make less/more errors, but it is also plausible that the 22 
frequency of errors that an employee makes can influence their attitude toward them (e.g., 23 
that employees who make a lot of mistakes tend to cover them up or to be more aware that 24 
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mistakes can occur or, in the opposite case, to perceive themselves as capable in detecting or 1 
correcting errors promptly). Similarly, drawing on Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) 2 
transactional stress theory, we hypothesized that individuals’ orientations toward errors are 3 
context-sensitive attitudes, thus their level may change also on the basis of the organizational 4 
culture employees are embedded in. However, we could also argue that bottom-up emergent 5 
processes might contribute to shape some cultural features (e.g., similar professional 6 
backgrounds can lead to shared believes about risk-taking or the value of learning from 7 
errors). In addition, to better understand the error orientation sensitivity to contextual factors, 8 
future research could also explore the interplay among factors at different levels, for instance 9 
adopting a multicenter design or integrating the proposed model with other individual (e.g., 10 
work self-efficacy), interpersonal (e.g., trustworthiness in peers or supervisor, team 11 
psychological safety climate), or organizational variables (e.g., safety climate).  12 
Another limitation of this study is related to the representativeness of the sample, as the 13 
data were obtained from a convenience sample, and not collected at the organizational level. 14 
As such, case studies or multilevel studies could add to the literature. Moreover, having based 15 
this study only on one single culture, a comparing approach with employees from other cultures 16 
is encouraged for future research (e.g., cross-national studies). Believing that error orientation is 17 
a highly culturally sensitive construct, future cross-cultural research needs to be conducted. 18 
 19 
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 1 
Figure 2. The tested model. 2 
 3 
 4 
Note: RSK= error risk taking, TNK= thinking about errors, COM= error communication, CPT= error 5 
competence, LRN= learning from errors, ANT= error anticipation, STR= error strain, COV= covering up errors.  6 
 7 
Please note that all the dimensions are latent measured by their indicators. In addition, the model includes the 8 
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Table 1. Summary of the studies using the EOQ’s scales or variants (in chronological order). 1 
 2 
Source Theoretical dimensions  
N 
dim. 



















EFA CFA  
Rybowiak et al., 1999 
(Study 1) 
X   X X X X X 6 X X 1= RSK; 4= CMP; 5= LRN; 6= ANT; 7= 
STR; 8= COV 
6 
Rybowiak et al., 1999 
(Study 2) 
X X X X X X X X 8 - -  X* 1= RSK; 2= TNK; 3= COM; 4= CMP; 5= 
LRN; 6= ANT; 7= STR; 8= COV 
8 
Fay & Frese, 2000 X        1 - -  X*** 1= RSK 1 
Korsten et al., 2004 X X X X X X X X 8 X*** - -  7= stress caused by error; 2, 3, 4, 8= attitude 
of dealing with errors; 1= RSK (5 and 6 
deleted) 
3 
Tjosvold et al., 2004  X X  X  X X 5 - -  X*** 2, 3= problem solving approach; 5= LRN; 7, 
8= blaming approach 
3 
Keith & Frese, 2005     X  X  2 - -  - -  5= LRN; 7= STR 2 
van Dyck et al., 2005 (Study 
1) 
 X X X X  X X 6 X - - 2, 3, 4, 5= error management; 7, 8= error 
aversion 
2 
van Dyck et al., 2005 (Study 
2) 
 X X X X    4 - - - - 2, 3, 4, 5= error management 1 
Arenas et al., 2006 X  X    X  3 - - - - 1= RSK; 3= COM; 7= STR 3 
Hofmann & Mark, 2006  X X     X 3 X X*** 2, 3, 8(rev) +other dimensions= safety 
climate  
1 
König et al., 2007   X      1 - - - -  3= COM 1 
Mark et al., 2007  X X     X 3 - - - -  2, 3, 8(rev) +other dimensions = safety 
climate 
1 
Tjosvold & Yu, 2007 X   X     2 - - - -  1= RSK; 4= CPT 2 
Harteis et al., 2008 X X X X X X X X 8 X - - 1, 5= appraisal of mistakes; 2, 3= strategies 
to learn from mistakes; 7, 8= negative 
emotions regarding mistakes (4 and 6 
deleted) 
3 
Schell & Conte, 2008    X   X  2 - - - - 4= LRN; 7= STR 2 
Carter & Beier, 2010     X    1 - - - - 5= LRN 1 
Cigularov et al., 2010  X X X X    4 X X*** 2, 3, 4, 5= error management 1 
Chughtai & Buckley, 2010   X      1 - - - - 3= COM 1 
Chang & Mark, 2011  X X     X 3 X - - 2= TNK, 3= COM; 8(rev)= COV 3 
Hetzner et al., 2011 X   X X  X  4 - - - - 1= RSK; 4= CPT; 5= LRN; 7= STR 4 
Amini & Mortzavi, 2012 X X X X X X X X 8 - - X*** 1= RSK; 2= TNK; 3= COM; 4= CMP; 5= 
LRN; 6= ANT; 7= STR; 8= COV 
8 
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Baglin & Da Costa, 2012     X  X  2 X - -  5= LRN; 7= STR 2 
Bauer & Mulder, 2013     X  X X 3 - - X*** 5= LRN; 7= STR; 8= COV 3 
Casey & Krauss, 2013  X X X X    4 X X*** 2, 3, 4, 5= error management 1 
Leicher et al., 2013     X  X X 3 - - X*** 5= LRN; 7= STR; 8= COV 3 
Putz et al., 2013  X   X  X  3 - - - - 2= TNK; 5= LRN; 7= STR 3 
Tulis, 2013   X     X 2 - -  - -  3= COM; 8= COV 2 
Fruhen & Keith, 2014  X X X X  X X 6 - - - - 2, 3, 4, 5= error management; 7, 8= error 
aversion 
2 
Steele-Johnson & Kalinoski, 
2014 
    X    1 - - X*** 5= LRN 1 
Yan et al., 2014 X X X  X  X X 6 - - - - 1, 2, 3, 5, 7(rev), 8(rev)= error learning 1 
Leicher & Mulder, 2016     X  X X 3 - - X*** 5= LRN; 7= STR; 8= COV 3 
King & Beher, 2017 X X X X X X X X 8 - - - - 1, 2, 3, 4, 5= positive error management; 6, 
8= negative error management; 7= strain 
3 
Rausch, Seifried & Harteis, 
2017 
X X X X X X X X 8 - - - - 1= RSK; 2= TNK; 3= COM; 4= CMP; 5= 
LRN; 6= ANT; 7= STR; 8= COV 
8 
Farnese et al., 2018  X X X X    4 - - X*** 2, 3, 4, 5= error management 1 
Lauzier & Mercier, 2018     X  X   - - - - 5= LRN; 7= STR 2 
Zotzmann et al., 2019 X X X X X X X X 8 - - - -  1= RSK; 2= TNK; 3= COM; 4= CMP; 5= 
LRN; 6= ANT; 7= STR; 8= COV  
and: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8= error orientation 
8-1 
Frequency of  
each dimension’s use 
13 19 22 17 26 9 22 19      
 1 
* CFA conducted at item level separately on each dimension; ** CFA conducted at facet level; *** Factor analysis conducted including error orientation items and 2 
other scales. 3 
 4 
Note: RSK=error risk taking, TNK= thinking about errors, COM= error communication, CPT= error competence, LRN= learning from errors, ANT= error 5 
anticipation, STR= error strain, COV= covering up errors. 6 
 7 
 8 
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Stress model framework 
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Attitude theory framework 
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Legend: RSK= error risk taking, TNK= thinking about errors, COM= error communication, CPT= error 6 
competence, LRN= learning from errors, ANT= error anticipation, STR= error strain, COV= covering up errors. 7 
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 1 
Table 3. Characteristics of the organizational contexts of the sample. 2 
 3 
PRODUCTIVE SECTORS n. % 
   Culture (education, tourism, information) 54 12.2 
   Trade (food, other goods) 54 12.2 
   Health and social assistance 91 20.5 
   Construction and transportation 64 14.4 
   Services (financial and insurance, consultants) 62 14.0 
   Security and Army  11 2.5 
   Public administration and other public services 98 22.1 
   Others (call centers, cleaning companies) 9 2.0 
TYPE   
   Private sector 245 55.2 
   Public sector 183 41.4 
   Non-for-profit sector 15 3.4 
SIZE   
   Micro (<15 employees) 77 17.3 
   Small (16–50 employees) 51 11.5 
   Medium (51–500 employees) 118 26.6 
   Large (>500 employees) 197 44.6 
GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION   
   Company nationally based, one office 147 33.1 
   Company nationally based, with local branches 227 51.1 
   International corporate 60 13.5 





Table 4. Work errors scale (items and descriptive statistics). 6 
 7 
     SLIPS/LAPSES MISTAKES 
   Item Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis Loadings* Loadings* 
1. Forget to perform a task 2.22 0.82 .176 -.557 .557  
2. Delay in the performance of a task 2.49 0.85 .062 -.489 .763  
3. Being distracted when working 2.82 0.88 -.331 -.120 .760  
4. Refer to incomplete or outdated 
knowledge to perform a task 
2.29 1.00 .445 -.393  .662 
5. Use an improper procedure 2.28 0.92 .466 -.069  .752 
6. Make decisions not effective for 
our customers 
2.17 0.92 .374 -.448  .754 
7. Fail to fully comply with protocols, 
procedures, or guidelines 
2.00 0.97 .756 -.052  .717 
 8 
* Results of the CFA 9 
 10 












Chi-Square CFI RMSEA SRMR 
 H0 Value H1 Value    Estimate DF p  Estimate  90 Percent C.I. p  
M1 -19791.063 -18447.216 39816.126 40296.126 39924.816 2687.694 623 .000 0.657 0.086 0.083  0.089 0.000 0.096 
M2 -19780.762 -18447.216 39795.524 40275.523 39904.213 2667.091 623 .000 0.660 0.086 0.082  0.089 0.000 0.098 
M3 -20119.190 -18447.216 40462.379 40921.866 40566.424 3343.947 628 .000 0.548 0.098 0.095  0.102 0.000 0.118 
M4 -19566.382 -18447.216 39374.763 39871.173 39487.169 2238.331 619 .000 0.731 0.077 0.073  0.080 0.000 0.082 
M5 -19218.700 -18447.216 38715.401 39285.656 38844.527 1542.968 601 .000 0.843 0.059 0.056  0.063 0.000 0.069 
 4 
 5 
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Table 6. Labels, original items by Rybowiak et al. (1999), items’ translation in Italian 2 
(italics, in brakets) and factor loadings of the 8-factor Confirmatory Factor model. 3 
 4 
Label Item Loadings 
ERROR RISK TAKING 
RSK1 If one wants to achieve at work, one has to risk making 
mistakes. [Se qualcuno vuole riuscire nel lavoro, deve 
rischiare di fare qualche errore] 
.618 
RSK2 It is better to take the risk of making mistakes than to `sit on 
one's behind. [È meglio assumersi il rischio di compiere 
qualche errore, piuttosto che stare a guardare] 
.783 
RSK3 To get on with my work, I gladly put up with things that can 
go wrong. [Per andare avanti con il mio lavoro, accetto di 
buon grado che le cose che possano andare male] 
.687 
RSK4 I’d prefer to err, than to do nothing at all. [Preferisco 
sbagliare piuttosto che non fare nulla] 
.448 
THINKING ABOUT ERRORS 
TNK1 After I have made a mistake, I think about how it came about. 
[Dopo aver commesso un errore, penso a come sia accaduto] 
.652 
TNK2 I often think: ‘How could I have prevented this?’ [Spesso 
penso: Come avrei potuto prevenire questa cosa?] 
.696 
TNK3 If something goes wrong at work, I think it over carefully. 
[Se qualcosa a lavoro va storta, ci rifletto su attentamente] 
.617 
TNK4 After a mistake has happened, I think long and hard about 
how to correct it. [Dopo che è successo un errore, penso 
molto a lungo a come correggerlo] 
.731 
TNK5 When a mistake occurs, I analyze it thoroughly. [Quando mi 
capita un errore, lo analizzo a fondo] 
.657 
ERROR COMMUNICATION 
COM1 When I make a mistake at work, I tell others about it in order 
that they do not make the same mistake. [Quando faccio un 
errore a lavoro, lo dico ai colleghi in modo che non lo 
ripetano] 
.762 
COM2 If I cannot rectify an error by myself, I turn to my colleagues. 
[Se non riesco a porre rimedio a un errore da solo, mi 
rivolgo ai colleghi] 
.730 
COM3 If I cannot manage to correct a mistake, I can rely on others. 
[Se non riesco a correggere un errore, posso fare 
affidamento sugli altri] 
.719 
COM4 When I have done something wrong, I ask others, how I 
should do it better. [Quando ho fatto qualcosa di sbagliato, 
ho chiesto agli altri come poter migliorare] 
. 547 
   ERROR COMPETENCE 
CPT1 When I have made a mistake, I know immediately how to 
correct it. [Se ho fatto un errore, so immediatamente come 
correggerlo] 
.628 
CPT2 When I do something wrong at work, I correct it 
immediately. [Quando faccio qualcosa di sbagliato a lavoro, 
lo correggo immediatamente] 
.557 
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CPT3 If it is at all possible to correct a mistake, then I usually know 
how to go about it. [Se è possibile correggere un errore, in 
genere io so come affrontare la cosa] 
.688 
CPT4 I don’t let go of the goal, although I may make mistakes. 
[Non abbandono il mio obiettivo, anche quando mi capita di 
fare qualche errore] 
.380 
LEARNING FROM ERRORS 
LRN1 Mistakes assist me to improve my work. [Gli errori mi sono 
d’aiuto per migliorare il mio lavoro] 
.792 
LRN2 Mistakes provide useful information for me to carry out my 
work. [Gli errori mi forniscono informazioni utili per 
svolgere il mio lavoro] 
.843 
LRN3 My mistakes help me to improve my work. [Gli sbagli mi 
aiutano a migliorare il mio lavoro] 
.820 
LRN4  My mistakes have helped me to improve my work. [Gli 




ANT1 In carrying out my task, the likelihood of errors is high. 
[Nello svolgere i miei compiti, la probabilità di fare errori è 
elevata] 
.612 
ANT2 Whenever I start some piece of work, I am aware that 
mistakes occur. [Ogni volta che inizio una nuova attività, 
sono consapevole che possono verificarsi degli errori] 
.398 
ANT3 Most of the time I am not astonished about my mistakes 
because I expected them. [La maggior parte delle volte non 
mi sorprendo dei miei errori perché me li aspettavo] 
.624 
ANT4 I anticipate mistakes happening in my work. [Prevedo gli 
errori che capitano nel mio lavoro] 
.505 
ANT5 I expect that something will go wrong from time to time. [Mi 
aspetto che qualcosa possa andare storto di tanto in tanto] 
.251 
ERROR STRAIN 
STR1 I find it stressful when I err. [Mi sento stressato/a quando 
sbaglio] 
.647 
STR2 I am often afraid of making mistakes. [Sono spesso 
preoccupato/a di poter fare errori] 
.664 
STR3 I feel embarrassed when I make an error. [Mi sento in 
imbarazzo quando mi capita di fare un errore] 
.674 
STR4 If I make a mistake at work, I ‘lose my cool’ and become 
angry. [Se faccio un errore a lavoro, perdo la calma e mi 
arrabbio] 
.715 
STR5 While working I am concerned that I could do something 
wrong. [Mentre lavoro sono preoccupato/a di poter fare 
qualcosa di sbagliato] 
.493 
COVERING UP WITH ERRORS 
COV1 Why mention a mistake when it isn’t obvious? [Perché 
parlare di un errore quando non è evidente?] 
.631 
COV2 It is disadvantageous to make one’s mistakes public. [Non è 
conveniente rendere pubblici gli errori di qualcuno] 
.580 
COV3 I do not find it useful to discuss my mistakes. [Non trovo 
utile discutere dei miei errori] 
.783 
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COV4 It can be useful to cover up mistakes. [Può essere 
vantaggioso coprire gli errori] 
.578 
COV5 I would rather keep my mistakes to myself. [Preferisco 
tenere per me i miei errori] 
.630 
COV6 Employees who admit to their errors, make a big mistake. [I 
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 1 
Table 7. Correlations among variables and their internal consistency (Cronbach’s alphas in parentheses).  2 
 3 
Error orientation’s factors Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis RSK TNK COM CPT LRN ANT STR COV ERR-S ERR-M PWD UAV 
1.  RSK–Error risk taking 3,82 0.63 -.281 -.327 (.716)            
2.  TNK–Thinking about errors 3.55 0.77 -.206 .086 .310** (.822)           
3.  COM–Error communication 3.82 0.56 -.117 -.163 .262** .396** (.780)          
4.  CPT–Error competence 3.80 0.79 -.120 -.099 .327** .430** .315** (.710)         
5.  LRN–Learning from errors 2.81 0.57 -.436 -.199 .545** .488** .324** .331** (.875)        
6.  ANT–Error anticipation 3.60 0.72 .039 .655 .341** .316** .168** .157** .321** (.597)       
7.  STR–Error strain 2.60 0.71 .238 .195 -.060 .253** .012 -.167** .076 .424** (.781)      
8.  COV–Covering up errors 1.92 0.66 .587 .190 -.205** -.146** -.303** -.166** -.215** .196** .398** (.797)     
9.  ERR-S–Errors (slips/lapses) 2.51 0.68 .063 -.271 .004 -.044 -.157** -.291** -.011 .104* .247** .223** (.730)    
10. ERR-M–Errors (mistakes) 2.19 0.77 .524 -.077 .073 -.016 -.165** -.247** .004 .205** .199** .235** .570** (.824)   
11. PWD–Power distance 2.86 0.81 .235 -.254 -.013 .029 -.214** -.032 -.052 .118* .207** .217** .231** .209** (.785)  
12. UAV–Uncert. avoidance 3.87 0.68 -.406 -.035 .073 .324** .243** .274** .198** .064 .064 -.132** -.062 -.186** .155** (.821) 
Factor score determinacy     .90 .92 .90 .88 .94 .86 .91 .90 .90 .91 .92 .91 
 4 
Note:  **p< .01 5 
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